If you wish to win greater support for a policy proposal, it’s useful to draw your audience’s attention to famous and respected historical figures who, were they still alive, would almost surely join you in supporting that position. For example, if you’re pressing for a policy of protective tariffs as a means of enriching the domestic economy, you help your cause by reminding people that among those in the past who’ve supported such tariffs are Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay, and Abraham Lincoln.
But support even more powerful is available if you can find a famous
and respected historical figure who, although well-known for holding
ideological or political views quite the opposite of your own,
nevertheless is on record as sharing your support for the particular
policy proposal in question. It’s for this reason that opponents of
more-open immigration never tire of quoting Milton Friedman’s (purported) claim that such immigration is inadvisable for a country with a welfare state. If even Milton Friedman
– who is well-known for his great skepticism of government-imposed
restrictions on peaceful activities – supported such a government
restriction, then the case for that restriction must be especially
strong, and those persons who nevertheless continue to oppose this
restriction must be excessively stubborn or unusually benighted.
In this spirit, those who today
oppose a policy of unilateral free trade frequently claim as an ally
none other than Adam Smith. With a deserved reputation as a staunch
defender of free markets generally, and of free trade especially, if even Adam Smith
in fact carved out exceptions to his case for free trade, then today’s
proponents of protectionism must have a near-ironclad case for their
support of wide government discretion to impose protective tariffs and
otherwise to affect international commercial arrangements.
Adam Smith, it is true, believed that there’s a necessary role in a
free society for government. Also true is the observation that Smith
acknowledged some exceptions to a policy of unilateral free trade. These
utterly mundane facts, however, do not begin to support the conclusion
that Smith was – or would be today – sympathetic to the pleas of
While he admitted the possibility that circumstances could arise to
justify a handful of limited exceptions to a policy of free trade, as I
(and many others)
read Smith, his presumption was clearly that a policy of unilateral
free trade should be the default position and that justification for any
deviation in practice from this policy must meet a high standard of
Adam Smith’s Exceptions…
Smith’s soaring 1776 volume, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776), is divided into five ‘Books.’ The crescendo of the entire work
is reached in Book IV, titled “Of Systems of Political Oeconomy.” It’s
in this part of The Wealth of Nations that Smith made his case most fully for a policy of unilateral free trade.
Part of Smith’s case for free trade is his explanation of how
unimpeded trade across political borders works to the advantage of the
masses of people of any nation whose government sticks to a policy of
free trade regardless of the trade policies pursued by other
governments. Another part of his case is an exposé of the fallacies at
the heart of what Smith called “the mercantile system” and what we today
Smith laid out the principal arguments made by mercantilists for
protectionism and (it’s not too strong to say) intellectually pulverized
each. Writing in October 1780 to Andreas Holt, Smith described his 1776
work as a “very violent attack upon” the mercantilist underpinnings of
Great Britain’s trade policies.
No fair-minded person can read The Wealth of Nations as a whole, or even just Book IV, and come away doubting that Smith ardently championed a policy of unilateral free trade.
And yet there are those exceptions – four of them, on a
typical reading – that Smith mentioned. These exceptions are, in the
order in which Smith took them up, protective tariffs for purposes of
(1) national security; (2) ensuring that imports are taxed by the home
government no less than the home government taxes domestically
produced goods and services that compete with imports; (3) pressuring
foreign governments to reduce their tariffs; and (4) ensuring
that workers in protected industries are not all hit suddenly and
unexpectedly with the need to find new jobs.
What to make of these exceptions? Not much, actually.
… are notably limited
The first exception – national security – is not an economic
exception at all. Yes, protective tariffs might be advisable in limited
circumstances to maintain military readiness. But Smith was clear that
such protection is a cost. Although security against foreign invasion is
unquestionably important, protectionism carried out to further this
security “is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the opulence
which can arise from it.”
The second exception – equalizing taxes – is also not really an
exception. A policy of free trade is one in which the home government
treats the sale and purchase of all goods and services identically,
regardless of where they are produced. Smith argued that if the home
government taxes the domestic production of some particular goods, then
failure to impose identical taxes upon the sale of imports that compete
with those domestically produced goods would give an artificial – and,
hence, economically distorting – advantage to the imports.
The third exception – using at home what are now known as
“retaliatory tariffs” in the hope of inducing tariff reductions abroad –
is indeed a genuine exception. But no sooner did Smith mention this
exception and its possible benefits than he cast doubt on its
advisability. He called the typical government official who in practice
would determine if retaliatory tariffs stand a good-enough prospect of
working an “insidious and crafty animal.” Such a person is hardly the
sort to be blithely trusted with power to obstruct trade. Furthermore,
Smith thought it important to explicitly observe that the domestic
citizens who bear the brunt of the very real costs of retaliatory
tariffs are seldom the same domestic citizens who would benefit from any
resulting reductions in tariffs by foreign governments.
The fourth exception – shielding workers in protected industries from
sudden and unexpected economic disruption – is, like each of the first
two ‘exceptions,’ not really one. Not only do such tariffs not promote
industry and growth, these tariffs should be reduced until they are eventually eliminated.
Fearful that too-quick and drastic liberalization of trade might unduly
harm workers in protected industries, Smith was willing to tolerate the
temporary continuation, but at falling rates, of some tariffs. Smith
thought it to be a matter of justice to workers, despite any resulting
reduced economic growth, for government to reduce existing tariffs
gradually – tariffs that, Smith is clear, should never in the first
place have been imposed.
One may agree or disagree with Smith on any or all of these so-called “exceptions.” But one cannot legitimately identify Smith’s own discussion of these “exceptions” as reason to doubt that he strongly believed that maximum widespread prosperity and justice over the long run are best ensured by a policy of unilateral free trade.
THIS ARTICLE ORIGINALLY POSTED HERE.